The Fable of the Bees or the Tragedy of the Commons? Reflections on Selfishness, Morality, and Social Cooperation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71263/kpwnap04Keywords:
Morality, Moral Tribes, Selfishness, Social CooperationAbstract
This essay aims to reflect on the philosophical coherence of ethical egoism, using Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees as an argumentative reference to discuss the idea that the exclusive pursuit of individual self-interest maximization would lead to better collective outcomes. Through a critical analysis of this proposition, we present as a counterpoint the argument of the tragedy of the commons, developed by various authors, which demonstrates that in a situation where resources are scarce, if each individual prioritizes only their own interest, resources would become insufficient for everyone. This would lead to social chaos, thereby dismantling the core premises of ethical egoism.
However, following the reflections proposed by Joshua Greene, morality emerged in the human species precisely to curb excessively selfish behavior, allowing humans to form groups and cooperate with one another, thus increasing their chances of survival. Nevertheless, the biological mechanisms that enabled the development of morality were originally designed for interaction within a limited number of people and are not as effective in managing the larger groups that exist today. This inefficiency allows for the existence of multiple competing groups that prioritize their own interests and gains over cooperation, further contributing to social chaos.
As a solution to this problem, we propose an argument that emphasizes moving away from ethical egoism while focusing on the formulation of fairer institutional norms and the moral quality of individuals.
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